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AMIn L. VANOVER*
Title VI! was enacted in part to help women combat the problems of sexual
discrimination and harassment in the worlace The statute was designed to
provide protection and remedies for women who found themselves in hostile
work environments. However, the courts disagree as to both what should be
considered a hostile work environment and the types of conduct that create a
hostile work environment. One source of this conflict is whether the hostility of a
work environment ought to be determined relative to the general type of work
environment-that is, whether it ought to be harder for a woman to show
harassment in a coarse, blue-collar work environment than in a more pristine,
white-collar environment. Another source of conflict is whether non-sex, but
nevertheless gender-based, behavior ought to be allowed to support a Title VII
claim. The author argues that because Title Vi's broad remedial purpose is
supposed to protect individuals from discrimination because of their sex, their
general type of work environment ought to be irrelevant, and non-sex, gender-
based behavior ought to be allowed to show discrimination because of sex. The
author concludes that the Sixth Circuit's recent decision refusing to take general
work environment into account and allowing a showing of non-sex behavior
when considering Title VII claims is the approach that best fulfills Title VII's
purpose.
I. ITRODUCTION
A woman works for a road construction company and is sexually harassed.1
The woman is called vulgar names2 and endures rude treatment during a typical
workday because of her gender A court agrees that the environment is crude and
vulgar.4 However, because a construction environment is rough and the woman
"chose" to work in that particular environment, the court does not validate her
* I want to dedicate this article to my family who has provided endless support throughout
my law school career. I would like to especially thank my husband, Rick Vanover, and my
mother, Connie Cravens, for their support and encouragement.
I See Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
2 Id at 1535 (showing that the supervisor called the female plaintiff such names as
"dumb" and "cunt!' and used other profanity in reference to her).
3 Id (showing one example in which the supervisor asked one of the woman's co-workers
over the CB radio, which could be heard by all of the employees, "Mark, sometimes don't you
just want to smash a woman in the face?," referring to the female plaintiff).
4 See id at 1538. The claim is evaluated in the context of a rough blue-collar environment.
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sexual harassment claim.5 Furthermore, because much of the harassment was
non-sexual in nature, the court found that the woman's Title VII sexual
harassment claim could not stand.6 This example shows how many circuits do not
allow sexual harassment claims to stand because of their positions regarding
whether the type of work environment and non-sex behavior should be taken into
account.7 Other circuits, however, such as the Sixth Circuit in Williams v.
General Motors Corp., are giving sexual harassment plaintiffs the full protection
of Title VII by not taking into account work environment and allowing non-sex
behavior to support a Title VII claim.8
Sexual harassment is a serious problem.9 As many as half of all women will
be harassed during their careers.10 Work productivity declines because victims of
sexual harassment are affected both physically and psychologically.11
Congress originally enacted Title VII to protect minorities in the workplace;
gender was added to Title VII in an attempt to defeat the bill.'2 Thus, early in
5 See infrq notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing of the court's views with
regard to work environment).
6 See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing the court's views with regard
to non-sex behavior).
7 See infra notes 47-139 and accompanying text (discussing the different circuits' views
on work environment and non-sex behavior and how their views affect women in our working
society).
8 See also discussion infra on pages 5-10 regarding the Sixth Circuit's stand on the work
environment and non-sex behavior issues.
9 See, e.g., Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VTI-A Better
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1989); Katherine S. Anderson, EmployerLiability Under
Title VIfor Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1258, 1258 (1987) (stating that sexual harassment of women is a "widespread, insidious
problem").
Sexual harassment can cause physical and psychological illness to the victim.
Furthermore, sexual harassment victims, their families, and the United States economy suffer.
The losses are incurred by American companies due to "absenteeism, lower productivity, and
employee turnover, that is, the costs of rehiring and retraining when talented staff leave because
of harassment." See ELLEN BRAVO & ELLEN CASSEDY, THE 9TO5 GUIDE TO COMBATING
SEXUAL HARAsSMENT: CANDID ADVICE FROM 9T5, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
WORKING WOMEN 41-50 (1992).
10 Pierce, supra note 9, at 1071 (citing B. GUTER, SEX AND THE WORKPLAcE 44 (1985)).
Even though there have been reports to the Bureau of National Affairs of women sexually
harassing men and same sex situations, "[t]ypically a female employee files a complaint against
a male co-worker." Id.
I Id. (noting that because a victim of sexual harassment suffers both physically and
psychologically,job performance of the victim is often impaired).
12 See, e.g., id. at 1072, 1075-76. In an attempt to defeat the bill, the word "sex"' was
added to the list of protected categories by Representative Howard Smith, an opponent of the
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Title VII history, courts did not construe Title VII to protect victims of sexual
harassment.13 Later, courts finally recognized sexual harassment, but only in quid
pro quo situations.14 Today, courts also recognize hostile work environment
sexual harassment. 15 Overall, there is still confusion between the courts as to what
bill. Because of this, there is little legislative history to guide the courts when it comes to sexual
harassment See id.
13 Id. at 1073 (noting that courts did recognize that sexual harassment was a problem, but
contended that Title VII did not protect victims of sexual harassment). See, e.g., Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F2d 983, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). By the late 1970's, courts began to recognize
claims of sexual harassment. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 1073 n.21.
14 See Pierce, supra note 9 at 1073. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a
woman submits to a supervisor's sexual demands. The sexual favors become a condition of the
victim's employment status. Supervisors, but not co-workers, can be liable for quid pro quo
sexual harassment because courts see only supervisors as having the power and ability to make
sexual favors a condition of employment. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 1260-61.
An employer may be liable if a supervisor is the sexual harasser in a Title VII sexual
harassment case. The "employer is subject to vicarious liability ... created by a supervisor with
immediate or successively higher authority over the employee... ." Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998). However, if an employee under sexual harassment has
suffered no tangible job consequences as a result of the supervisor's actions, then the employer
may raise an affirmative defense to liability. Id at 765. To use this defense, the employer must
show that he exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior
and that the employee was unreasonable in not taking advantage of any "preventative or
corrective opportunities" provided by the employer. Id; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
Overall, if an employer reacts swiftly and appropriately to a victim's complaint of
supervisor harassment, the court should not find the employer liable. If an employer is found
liable in such an instance, Title VII's deterrent policy is undermined. Furthermore, under an
agency analysis, when the employer quickly stops the harassment, any semblance of authority
that the harasser may have had is eradicated. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d
258,266 (5th Cir. 1999) (analyzing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 791-92, 801).
15 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Pierce, supra note 9, at 1075.
The Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc. stated that the workplace must be "permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment" 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67). A hostile work environment can be created
by either a supervisor or a co-worker. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 1260-62.
Whether sexual harassment is quid quo pro or hostile work environment makes no
difference in the standard for employer liability. These two types of harassment are only
relevant to the question of whether a plaintiff proves a violation of Title VII. Brown v. Perry,
184 F.3d 388, 394 (4th Cir. 1999) (construing Burlington, 524 U.S. at 751). See supra note 14
(describing the standard for employer liability if the harasser is a supervisor).
However, an employer may be liable for the sexual harassment of its workers "where its
own negligence is a cause of the harassment ... if it knew or should have known about the
conduct but failed to stop it." Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing Burlington, 524 U.S. at 759).
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extent sexual harassment claims should be successful because of differing views
on such issues as work environment and non-sex behavior.
In Williams v. General Motors Corp.,16 a case decided under a hostile work
environment claim, the Sixth Circuit decided two issues that are sources of
controversy with regard to a sexual harassment claim: (1) whether an employee's
work environment should be included in the analysis, and (2) whether non-sex
behavior can be used to prove a sexual harassment claim.17 This case provides the
focal point for analysis of these pivotal issues in sexual harassment hostile work
environment claims. It should be noted that most cases regarding Title VII sexual
harassment look at only one of the two issues discussed in this note-work
environment or non-sex behavior. However, Williams is unique in that it decides
both issues. In Part II, an in-depth analysis of Williams provides the basis to
explain why work environment should not be considered and why non-sex
behavior should be considered in a hostile work environment claim. In Part III, I
set out the split among the courts concerning work environment, while in Part IV,
I discuss the split concerning non-sex behavior. In Part V, I explain why courts
should follow the lead of Williams in not allowing work environment to be taken
into account while allowing non-sex behavior to be considered in hostile work
environment sexual harassment cases.
II. WILLIAMS v GENERAL MOTORS CORP.
The Sixth Circuit decided that the plaintiff in Williams created a question of
material fact with regard to her sexual harassment hostile work environment
claim.18 Before remanding the case, the court established two important and
controversial guidelines for the lower court to follow.19 The Williams court
decided that the particular type of work environment should not be considered
Five prongs must be met in order for the plaintiffto establish a prima facie case in a hostile
work environment claim. First, the plaintiff must prove that she was a member of a protected
class. Second, she must show that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment Third, the
harassment must be based on her sex. Fourth, the harassment must have created a hostile work
environment. Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the supervisor's actions were foreseeable or
within the scope of the employee's employment and that the employer did not adequately
respond. See, eg., Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F3d 553, 561 (6th Cir. 1999).
In this article I focus on the third and fourth prongs: whether the particular type of work
environment can be taken into account when deciding if an environment is hostile, and whether
non-sex behavior harassment can be based on the victim's sex.
16 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
17 Seeid at 553.
18 Id. This case came to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals after the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
General Motors Corporation. Id
19 See id
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when deciding whether a certain environment is hostile and that non-sex behavior
can be used to support a hostile work environment claim.20
The plaintiff in Williams worked the midnight shift in the crib, a warehouse
for storing materials used in a plant of the General Motors Corporation. The
plaintiff claimed that the sexual harassment she experienced consisted of both
sexual and non-sexual behavior. For instance, she alleged many instances of
sexual harassment including offensive language, sexual remarks, and a number of
practical jokes being played against her. In addition, the plaintiff claimed she was
denied access to certain areas and denied breaks.21 The plaintiff filed suit alleging
hostile work environment sexual harassment.
22
A. Work Environment
The Williams court rejected the Tenth Circuit's position in Gross v. Burggraf
Const. Co.,23 which took into account a blue-collar working environment. The
Gross standard requires more sexual harassment in rough environments than
pristine work environments in order to have a claim under Title V1. 24 The Sixth
Circuit claimed that the same behavior, which would be considered sexual
harassment in a more refined atmosphere, should also be considered sexual
harassment in a less refined atmosphere regardless of whether sexually harassing
behavior is expected of workers in a less refined environment. Williams stressed
that just because a woman chooses to work in a rougher environment does not
mean that she relinquishes her sexual harassment claims under Title VII.25 The
Williams court felt that a woman in a vulgar work environment has just as much
right to bring a sexual harassment claim as a woman in a more polite
2 0 Id. at 553, 564-65.
21 Id at 559. Offensive remarks included swear words and addressing plaintiff as "slut."
Many sexual comments were made to the plaintiff such as "you can rub up against me anytime"
and "you can back right up to me" while the plaintiff was bending over to pick up some
supplies. Further, while the plaintiff was writing "Hancock Furniture Company," a co-worker
stated "you left the dick out of the hand." Id. The plaintiff alleged that she was forced to take the
midnight shift, was denied overtime, was the only employee denied a break, was the only
employee not to have a key to the office, and was not allowed to sit by the window in the crib.
Practical jokes included gluing plaintiff's toolbox to her desk, padlocking the plaintiff in the
crib, and blocking plaintiff's way with materials, including buggies (motorized carts which
were used to haul supplies). Also, co-workers threw items at the plaintiff. Id
22Id
23 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
24 Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (rejecting Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538).
2 5 Actually, the Sixth Circuit found that the Tenth Circuit's view is illogical because it
meant that the more hostile the environment, the harder it would be to win a Title VII hostile
work environment claim. The Sixth Circuit held that women in a working trade deserve no less
protection than women in other trades. Id at 564.
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environment. Thus, the court in Williams looked to the surrounding circumstances
without regard to whether the environment is more or less refined.
The Williams court reasoned that the type of work environment does not have
to be considered in a sexual harassment case because other factors under Title VII
allow a court not to enforce the forbidden "general civility code." The Sixth
Circuit held that tests given under the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v.
Sundowner Shores Services, Inc.2 6 prevent the imposition of a general civility
code. Thus, according to Williams, under Oncale, the Tenth Circuit's attempt to
take environment into account is unnecessary.27
B. Non-Sex Behavior
Williams shows that non-sex behavior can be sexually harassing. The "based
on sex" prong of a hostile work environment claim28 does not require sexual
conduct if pranks or other non-sex behavior evinces an "anti-female animus."2 9
This means that a sufficient showing of "anti-female animus" needs to be
demonstrated to prove that non-sexual conduct is sexually harassing. To show
that such conduct is based on sex, a plaintiff must simply show that the conduct
was based on her sex, or in other words, the conduct occurred because she is a
woman.30 Therefore, the co-worker's pranks, such as gluing the plaintiff's
toolbox to her desk, could be included in her sexual harassment claim if she could
show that the toolbox was glued to her desk because she was a woman?'
Therefore, the Williams approach allows more instances of conduct to be included
in a plaintiff's sexual harassment hostile work environment claim.32
26 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
27 Under Harris v. Forklift Systems, one of the issues that the plaintiff must prove is that
the plaintiff experienced sexual harassment by both subjective and objective standards. 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993). In this way, in order to prove the objective standard, a plaintiff must show
that other people in her situation would find the work environment sufficiently hostile. See
Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
28 See supra note 15 (discussing the prongs that need to be satisfied in order to have a
successful hostile work environment claim).
29 Williams, 187 F.3d at 565 (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 905 (lst Cir.
1988)).
30 See id at 656 (citing, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir.
1982)).
31 The Sixth Circuit stated that the plaintiff could prove that the pranks were based on her
sex by looking at other instances in which the plaintiff was treated differently because of her
gender. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 565-66. Thus, circumstantial evidence can be shown to prove
that the behavior was because of the plaintiff's sex.
32 Williams has already been cited for its proposition regarding non-sex behavior. See, eg.,
Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 E3d 933, 941-42 (6th Cir. 2000); Brown v.
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C. Oncale's Impact on Circuit Decisions
The Supreme Court's decision in Oncale33 needs to be briefly addressed as
circuits are citing Oncale with regard to whether a particular type of work
environment should be taken into account in a Title VII sexual harassment claim.
Furthermore, courts on both sides of this work environment issue are citing
Oncale for support.3 4 The case addressed whether people could be sexually
harassed by members of the same sex. However, dicta in the case suggests
answers for dealing with work environment in a Title VII sexual harassment
claim. While looking at Oncale with regard to work environment I also discuss
what effect the spirit of Oncale should have with regard to the issue of non-sex
behavior and sexual harassment claims. The Supreme Court held in Oncale that
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII' 5 and that social context
should be taken into account in a common sense way to "enable courts and juries
to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the
same sex... ."36 The Court, overall, emphasizes looking to work environment to
Columbus Mun. Airport Auth., 210 F3d 371, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); Whitaker v. Mercer
County, 65 F. Supp.2d 230,242 (D.N.J. 1999).
For a further summary of Williams, see the following article: J. Kirby Fowler, Jr. &
Pamela J. White, Recent Developments in Employment Law, 35 TORT & INs. LJ. 263, 270-71
(Winter 2000).
33 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
34 Courts are still split with regard to work environment after Oncale. The Tenth Circuit,
citing Oncale, continues to follow its prior decisions taking work environment into account. See
Pascouau v. Martin Marietta Corp., 185 F3d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit also
takes work environment into account and cites to Oncale in making this determination. See
Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit
changed its position since Oncale and, although noting that the thrust of Oncale involved same-
sex sexual harassment cites to Oncale for the reason it changed. See Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit only looks to work
environment to distinguish between teasing and harassment, not to show, like the Tenth and
Eighth Circuits, that the environment was sexually charged, which makes a Title VII case
difficult to prove. Overall, at least some courts feel that Oncale was a proposition by the
Supreme Court that a particular work environment should be taken into account, making it
more difficult for a woman who works in a rough environment to have a claim under Title VII.
However, the Sixth Circuit in Williams cites Oncale when discussing its position on work
environment, namely that the particular type of work environment should not be taken into
account when deciding whether the plaintiff has a successful sexual harassment claim under
Title VII. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
35 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 76 ("This case presents the question whether workplace harassment
can violate Title VII's prohibition against 'discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex'. . . when the
harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex.").
36 Id at 82. The Court emphasized that Title VII is not a "general civility code" and that
Title VII involves only behavior that alters the conditions of the victim's employment.
However, the Court again explained this assertion in the context of same-sex sexual
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understand the social relations between the different actors; however, the Court
does not suggest that the particular type of work environment should be taken into
account when deciding what is and is not sexual harassment under Title Vf.37 In
any case, the guidance was given in dicta and courts are still deciding these issues
in both directions. 38
After Oncale was decided, the Sixth Circuit in Williams declared that non-sex
behavior could be used to assert a sexual harassment claim, as long as the plaintiff
could show that the non-sex behavior was because of sex.39 Even though the
harassment. See id. (emphasizing that social context should be taken account of and using the
example that a football player smacking another on the buttocks is not sexual harassment).
Some scholars purport that even though the Court asserts that Title VII is not meant to
force a civility code, the Court in Oncale, by its reasoning, actually allows the Court to ignore a
particular type of work environment and take on the role of "manners police." See Dabney D.
Ware & Bradley R. Johnson, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: Perverted Behavior
Leads To A Perverse Ruling, 51 U. FLA. L. REV. 489, 490 (1999). In this way, to prove sexual
harassment, one does not have to look at work environment, namely how others were treated, in
order to have a successful claim. See id. at 501. It is argued that if one does not have to look to
how others were treated in a particular environment, the only thing left is overall social norms.
Therefore, Oncale allows the courts to take the role of "manners police" without the need to
look at a particular work environment despite language to the contrary in the Oncale decision.
See id at 504.
37The Court states that juries should look at context in order to "distinguish between
simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and [to find] conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive!' Oncale
523 U.S. at 82. Furthermore, the Court states that the work environment is to be used to look to
the "expectations" and the "relationship" between the co-workers in the environment. See id. In
this way, one may assume that social context is looked at only to see if the plaintiffwas actually
harassed instead of teased and not to determine if the plaintiff's choice of a rough blue-collar
working environment makes the plaintiff somehow deserve the harassing conduct. Thus,
Oncale does not suggest simply looking to the type of work environment in place-such as
putting a label on the environment as rough or refined, but actually looking to the interaction of
the co-workers and the interaction between the plaintiff and the harasser. This assertion can be
seen by the example given in Oncale concerning work environment: If a coach smacks a
football player on the buttocks, sexual harassment has not taken place. However, if the secretary
of the coach, an employee in the same work environment, smacks a football player on the
buttocks, sexual harassment may have taken place. Id In the end, Oncale wants there to be a
safeguard; the central question when looking at work environment becomes: Was this teasing
or roughhousing or was this sexual harassment? This question is answered by examining the
relationship between the harasser and the plaintiff in the work environment and does not consist
of labeling the work environment to be of a specific type and thus making the standard for
proving sexual harassment higher or lower depending on the label assigned to the work
environment.
38 See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text for specific details regarding Williams.
39 See Williams, 187 F.3d at 553. Even after Oncale, the Tenth Circuit continues to decide
cases in which non-sex conduct is barred from supporting a Title VII claim. See Shoemaker v.
Nat'l Mgmt. Res. Corp., 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998); Turner v. Reynolds Ford, Inc., 145
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Sixth Circuit does not cite to Oncale, it follows the spirit of Oncale regarding
non-sex behavior40 This is because Oncale insists on a broad interpretation of the
behavior allowed as evidence in a Title VII sexual harassment claim, and Oncale
states that what is most important in bringing a successful sexual harassment
claim is to show, regardless of what type the harassment is, that the harassment
was "because of sex."4 1 Therefore, Willian agrees with the spirit of Oncale in
that non-sex behavior can be used in a Title VII claim either as supporting other
F.3d 1346 (10th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit still uses strong language requiring
the conduct to be "overtly sexual" in nature. See Turner, 145 F.3d at 1346. In this way, not only
does the Tenth Circuit go against the spirit of Oncale concerning non-sexual behavior, but also
goes a step further. The Tenth Circuit does not allow behavior that is sexual in nature to support
a Title VII claim if the behavior is not "clearly sexual." The Tenth Circuit, which cites to
Oncale's dicta to support its work environment position, ignores the spirit of Oncale when
looking at non-sex behavior-not even acknowledging Oncale's broad construction of what is
considered sexual harassment
4 0 See Williams, 187 F.3d at 566 (urging that the law does recognize non-sex behavior and
cites to other circuits who have taken the same position on non-sex behavior before Oncale was
decided).
41 Oncale, 523 U.S at 78. First, the Court reasoned that Title VII "evinces a congressional
intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment." Id. Therefore, in order to do justice to Title VII, it should be construed broadly,
giving same-sex sexual harassment equal protection under the law. It is important to note,
however, that the plaintiff involved in Oncale was harassed only by conduct that was sexual in
nature. See id. (showing that the plaintiff was subjected to sexual humiliation in front of co-
workers and that the plaintiff was assaulted in a sexual manner and threatened with rape).
Second, the Court clearly states in dicta that a harasser's motivation to harass need not be
sexual in nature. "But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 79. But the Court spoke of this assertion
in terms of same-sex sexual harassment, although the Court did not specifically limit this
assertion to same-sex sexual harassment. See id.
Third, the Court states that the critical issue in a sexual harassment case is whether the
plaintiff was harassed because of sex. "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed.' Ii (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S.
17, 25 (1993)). Thus, the Court neutrally states that terms and conditions of employment must
only be experienced by one sex, however, the Court does not state that these terms and
conditions must be sexual in nature.
Further, the Court states that typically sexual harassment is shown with "explicit or
implicit proposals of sexual activity." Id On the other hand, the Court does not mandate that all
claims must show harassment of a sexual nature. As a matter of fact, the Court seems to accept
the idea that the harassment involved may not follow the typical case and thus a plaintiff may
still have a claim of sexual harassment without evidence of harassment that is sexual in nature.
Overall, Oncale simply requires that the harassment in question be based on sex. See id
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instances of sexual conduct towards the plaintiff or as evidence of harassment
without any sexual behavior accompanying the non-sex conduct. 2
The Sixth Circuit strongly asserts its position that "judgments by the court as
to a woman's assumption of risk upon entering a hostile work environment are
improper."43 Despite the fact that other circuits have interpreted Oncale with
regard to work environment differently, the Sixth Circuit, actually citing Oncale,
asserts that the atmosphere of a particular work environment is not to be taken
into account under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit reasons that looking at a work
environment is unnecessary because the objective test of whether a reasonable
person would feel that the behavior was sexual harassment, which every court
considers, prevents Title VII from becoming a civility code. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit understands the "civility code" reasoning in Oncale in light of the
objective test set forth by the Supreme Court.44 In this way, the "civility code"
does not extend to each and every work environment, but rather deals with not
making employers in general live up to an ideal standard set by the court, which is
unattainable in practicality. The Williams court goes on to say that while courts
may want to look to a social setting to distinguish between teasing and
harassment, a court should never assume a woman enters a rough workplace on
her own and thus deserves what she gets.
45
Therefore, if the workplace is to be looked at all, it cannot be considered to
show that a woman took the risk of harassment by accepting a job in a rough
environment, or that women in rough, blue-collar type environments need to
endure more harassment just to have a claim equal to those of other women in
better environments. As a result, the Sixth Circuit after Oncale made its position
clear: the type of work environment involved cannot be considered when
deciding a hostile work environment claim.
42 Williams did not explicitly elaborate about what is needed to prove that non-sex
behavior was because of gender, but one can assume that circumstantial evidence showing that
the conduct was based on sex is all that is needed to bring a Title VII claim under Williams.
This is because Williams asserted that the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff was
enough to show that the non-sex conduct was based on sex. See Williams, 187 F3d at 533. In
Williams, the fact that the plaintiff was ostracized when other male co-workers were not and
subjected to gender-specific epithets demonstrated that the behavior was based on sex. See i& at
565-66. These instances show, according to the Sixth Circuit, that the non-sexual behavior,
such as gluing tools to the plaintiffs desk, was based on sex, even though the conduct was non-
sexual in nature. See id.
43 See Williams, 187 F.3d at 556.
44Seeid at 564.
45 See id
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D. Overall Impact ofWilliams
Overall, Williams made it easier for plaintiffs to bring a sexual harassment
suit under Title VII. First, Williams gives blue-collar workers the same protection
as white-collar workers. Second, Williams allows a plaintiff to add non-sexual
instances to a claim, which can add to the strength of the plaintiffs claim. Thus,
circuits that follow the reasoning in Williams give more success to Title VII
plaintiffs bringing a hostile work environment claim than circuits that do not
agree with Williams on these two issues.
Ill. THE SPLIT AMONG THE COURTS CONCERNING WORK ENVIRONMENT
There is a split among the courts as to whether the particular type of work
environment should be considered in a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim. Some courts believe that if a woman chooses to enter or stay in
a work environment that is known to be rough and sexually harassing, the woman
does not have as strong of a claim under Title VII as a woman who chooses to
work in an environment that is perceived to be wholesome and without sexual
harassment Other courts believe that work environments saturated with sexual
harassment are exactly what Title VII was intended to eradicate and thus do not
take the type of work environment atmosphere into account when deciding if
there is a claim under Title VII.
A. Courts That Do Not Take Work Environment Into Account
Some courts do not take a particular work environment into account when
deciding if a sexual harassment claim under Title VII exists. In other words, the
court only looks at the circumstances of the harassment and divorces these
circumstances from the overall wholesomeness or rudeness of a particular work
environment. In addition to the Sixth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit have also decided not to take work environment into account 46
1. Fifth and Sixth Circuits-Polluted Work Environments
Are What Title VfI Was Meant to Cure
In 1989, before the Sixth Circuit decision in Williams, the Fifth Circuit
declared that work environment would be ignored in Wyerick v. Bayou Steel
Corp.47 The plaintiff in Wyerick worked as a crane operator on the night shift.
46 See, e.g., Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1989); Baskerville v.
Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
47 887 F.2d at 1271. It is important to note that this case was brought under Louisiana
Revised Statute § 23.1006, an analog to Title VII. However, the way in which the sexual
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After complaining about the type of care she received in the doctor's office of the
plant, the plaintiff became the target of numerous sexual remarks.4 8 Sexual
comments were made both by co-workers and supervisors on a daily basis. 9
Often over the factory radio system, sexual talk was used. Further, the work
environment was charged with sexual nuances and games50 The plaintiff
reported the incidents, but no direct action was taken by Bayou Steel
Corporation. 5 l
The Fifth Circuit remanded the claim, holding that the district court's
summary judgment could not be upheld since the district court took work
environment into account. The Fifth Circuit clearly stated that "work
environments 'heavily charged' or 'heavily polluted' with racial or sexual abuse
are at the core of the hostile work environment theory."52 Therefore, if an
environment is heavily charged with sexual innuendo, a Title VII claim is not
barred, but welcomed. The Fifth Circuit felt that work environments that are
rough and sexually explicit are not to be rejected because of the atmosphere, but
that Title VII, as well as the comparable Louisiana state statute, were made to
embrace and correct such situations.53 To this day, Wyerick has not been
overturned.54
harassment claim was dealt with has important ramifications for all sexual harassment claims in
the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 1271, 1274. Louisiana courts in the past have decided that their state
statute is "similar in scope" to Title VII and look to Title VII for guidance. The same five factor
test is used in the Louisiana statute and Title VII. See supra note 15 for a discussion of the five
factors used in deciding hostile work environment harassment claims.
4 8 Id. at 1272. The plaintiff, while on her shift on June 28, 1987, had chest pain and
difficulty breathing. She went to the first aid station for treatment and later complained about
the quality of the services to supervisors and fellow employees. Id
49 See id and supra note 2. The comments were made over the radio and in person.
Comments included remarks about the plaintiff's breasts, male co-workers having a "hard on,"
performing "mouth-to-mouth," and calling the plaintiffnames such as "flcking bitch." Id
5 0 Id. Terminology over the radios included sexual connotations such as "stick it in" and
"how deep is it." The court found relevant that the plaintiff did admit that there were a few
times when she retorted with a sexual comment because the facts showed that she participated
and accepted the environment and thus the harassment was not unwelcome. Id at 1272, 1275.
51 See id at 1272-73. The plaintiff complained to her employer, and the employer
recognized the harassment but took no steps to rectify it, even though plaintiff's employer
promised her that immediate action would be taken. Id.
52 Id. at 1275 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66 (1986)).
53 See id
54 Even though Wyerick has not been overturned, the Fifth Circuit has changed its
reasoning in this area. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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2. Seventh Circuit-Not Distinguishing Between Environments in
Deciding Title VI Sexual Harassment Cases
The Seventh Circuit has not explicitly agreed with the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits, but when deciding whether a work environment was hostile, the Seventh
Circuit has not distinguished between different types of working environments.
Instead, the court spelled out a test that applies to all work environments,
regardless if the environment is pristine or filled with sexual comments and
conduct The test, articulated in Baskerville v. Culligan International Co.,55
allows the jury to decide on which side of the "line" conduct falls-the "line
between a merely unpleasant working environment... and a hostile or deeply
repugnant one on the other."56
The court developed a test for all working environments, which does not take
into account the atmosphere of any particular work environment. Thus, even
though the Seventh Circuit did not state that work environment is not to be
considered, one can infer that the Seventh Circuit does not look to this behavior
because its test does not find the atmosphere of a work environment to be
important. Since the Baskerville decision, the Seventh Circuit has not looked at
work atmosphere as a factor in its analysis of sexual harassment claims.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit is essentially in agreement with the Sixth Circuit in
Williams.
B. Courts that Take Work Environment into Account
The Tenth Circuit is the leading proponent of the position that a plaintiff who
chooses to work in an environment that is sexually hostile accepts that
55 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff in Baskerville was a secretary for a
manufacturing plant, and her supervisor made numerous sexual comments to her and called her
"pretty girl" and "tilly." Further, the plaintiff's supervisor made such comments as "urn urn urn"
when the plaintiff turned to leave; told her the office was hot once she stepped into it; that his
wife told him to think of the plaintiff as Anita Hill; and that she and the supervisor must have
been dancing in his office because it was smoky. Further, the plaintiff's supervisor made
motions with his hand in a way to suggest masturbation. Id at 430.
56 Id. at 430-31 (stating that this is not a "bright line" test). Although the Seventh Circuit
in dicta refused to treat a blue-collar working environment differently from a white-collar
environment, the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was overturned. The court found that the
employer took all reasonable steps necessary to stop the harassment, and the comments were
sparse and spread out over a course of seven months. Id. at 428, 431-32 (showing that the
employer spoke vith the harasser and that the harasser was given a warning; the harassment
stopped after action by the employer was taken). No liability could be found because under
Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, the Supreme Court stated that to be hostile the
work environment must be severe and pervasive.
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environment when taking the job.57 Further, the Tenth Circuit states that a blue-
collar working environment has a different social context than a white-collar
environment. Thus, the blue-collar working environment should be taken into
account when deciding what is hostile according to the norms of that particular
working environment 58 The Eighth Circuit has followed the Tenth Circuit's lead.
Thus, when a plaintiff works in a sexually hostile environment a claim under
Title VII is harder to prove.59 However, the Tenth and Fifth Circuits differ in how
they use work environment in their sexual harassment analyses. In contrast to the
Tenth and Eighth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit only looks at work environment to
distinguish between teasing-type behavior and actual harassment and does not
consider characteristics of the work environment to show that the environment
was sexually charged.
1. Tenth and Eighth Circuits-Title VfTMeant Only for Harassment that
Makes the Current Rough Work Environment Even Worse
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit declared its stance concerning work atmosphere in
Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza.60 The plaintiffs were employed by a truck plaza
restaurant 61 The Tenth Circuit noted that the atmosphere was filled with rough
language, but found that Title VII was not intended to change the social mores of
American workplaces.62 Thus, the plaintiff lost her claim because the harassment
57 See, e.g., Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989); Sauers v. Salt
Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th
Cir. 1995); Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).
58 In this way, the Tenth Circuit will ask with every claim: Is this more hostile than
everyday working conditions in this environment?
59 This is in stark contradiction to the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim.
60 878 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1989).
61 Id. One current and five former employees brought suit. Id.
62 Id. at 339 (discussing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F.Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich.
1984)). "In Rabidue it was held that Title VII was not intended to cover language in the
workplace that was 'rough hewn and vulgar,' nor was Title VII designed 'to bring about a
magical transformation in the social mores of American workers."' Id.
It should be noted that the Rabidue court's holding regarding the issue of psychological
injury has been overruled. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993).
Rabidue is a Sixth Circuit case decided before Williams. After Williams, however,
Rabidue has only been cited once in an unpublished decision with regard to the fact that Title
VII was not to bring about a change in the social mores of the American workplace. However,
the case was distinguished from Rabidue because the comments that the plaintiff claimed were
sexually harassing were made to the plaintiff specifically. See Felger v. Tubetech, Inc., No. 99-
3020, 2000 WL 263276, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2000). However, in the end, Williams makes
clear that "the standard for sexual harassment does not vary depending on the work
environment." Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 555 (6th Cir. 1999). Overall,
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she complained of was "commonplace" and Title VII was not designed to alter
"commonplace" behavior in certain working environments.
In 1993, the Tenth Circuit in Sauers v. Salt Lake County6 3 again asserted that
the atmosphere of a working environment is an important factor in a Title VII
hostile work environment claim. In this case, a jury found for the plaintiff with
regard to sexual harassment However, the district court did not consider the
conduct sexually harassing and overturned the jury's verdict. 64 The Tenth Circuit
upheld the district court's decision.65
The Tenth Circuit found that this was an unusually rough and sexually
charged atmosphere. Further, the court stated that this raw atmosphere was known
and tolerated by all employees, including the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff
alleged that the atmosphere worsened when the county attorney decided not to
run for re-election.66 Thus, the court essentially stated that because the plaintiff
did not complain about and even participated in the sexually charged atmosphere,
the plaintiff was barred from claiming relief under Title VII because the behavior
was not unwelcome. 67 The argument is flawed, however, because the conduct the
plaintiff complained of was not ordinary sexual banter, but specific harassment
directed toward the plaintiff that was not experienced by the plaintiff for the first
two years of her employment. The court stated that the plaintiff accepted the
specific harassment because she knew of the general rough work environment
and tolerated it. This means that if the plaintiff worked in a pristine office
environment, the same sexually harassing conduct most likely would have been
actionable under Title VII. In this way, a plaintiff working in a rough atmosphere,
such as a blue-collar atmosphere, does not receive the same protection under the
law.
Rabidue has not been construed against Williams' assertion in this regard by the Sixth Circuit
This is unlike the Tenth Circuit, which has quoted Rabidue in order to find a sexual harassment
claim prohibited because of a particularly rough working environment. See Gross, 53 F3d at
1538.
63 1 F3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
64 Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 722 F. Supp. 676 (D. Utah 1989).
65 Sauers, I F.3d at 1126-27. The plaintiff admitted the rough atmosphere and admitted
being called "bruiser," making the men in the office avoid the plaintiff. Also, a number of
witnesses stated that the plaintiff had engaged in the raw atmosphere by participating in off-
color joking and sexual conversations. Id.
66 Id. at 1126. The attorney made comments about the plaintiff's breasts and attire and
asked the plaintiff to "swap spit" Further, the attorney outlined a pattem of plaintiff's sweater in
the air in front of her breasts. The attorney attempted to grab her breasts and rubbed his groin
against her shoulder. lI at 1126-27.
67 See id (stating that the co-worker's conduct "was not viewed by plaintiff as unwelcome
sexual harassmenf').
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In 1995, the Tenth Circuit again asserted its stance on work environment and
sexual harassment in Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co.68 The plaintiff,
employed as a water-trck driver, asserted that her supervisor treated her in a
vulgar manner because she was a woman.69 Before deciding if the environment
was sufficiently hostile under Title VII, the court examined the atmosphere of
plaintiff's work environment. The court noted that in the world of road
construction, profanity and vulgarity are not considered hostile. Further, the court
noted that the plaintiff had been vulgar with crew members as well.7 0 The Tenth
Circuit for the first time stated bluntly: 'The standard for determining sex
harassment would be different depending upon the work environment" 71 The
court then explained that Title VII was not meant to change social norms.7 2 Thus,
again, employees in rough atmospheres, mostly blue-collar work environments,
are treated differently under Title VII. According to Gross, even if the plaintiff
was treated rudely because of her gender, the work environment was rough and
the plaintiff should have expected such treatment. Therefore, the conduct of the
plaintiff's supervisor, even if actionable in other environments, is not actionable
in this sexually charged and raw environment under Title VII.73
68 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
69 Id. at 1531, 1536. The supervisor would harass the plaintiff in front of other employees,
would call her "dumb" and "cunt," and used other profanity in reference to her. One time over a
CB radio, the supervisor asked one of plaintiff's co-workers: "Mark, sometimes don't you just
want to smash a woman in the face?" Id.
70 Id. at 1537-38. The plaintiff admitted to using profane language and telling off-color
jokes on occasion.
71 Ia at 1538 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
Further, the Court explained that Title VII was not meant to stop sexual jokes, conversations, or
the passing around of"girlie" magazines. See id.
72 See id On a side note, some courts find a rough work environment not offensive or
hostile because both men and women are equally subjected to the roughness. Therefore, these
courts would feel that a woman can be called a "cunt" just as long as men are also called
"pricks," and further, posters of nude men and women would not be hostile because it would be
offensive to both genders. See B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual
Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1993). This ignores the fact that men and
women may react to these stimuli differently. See id
73 The Tenth Circuit continues to decide Title VII cases by taking into account the
particular work environment of the plaintiffs. In 1997, the Tenth Circuit, in Smith v. Northwest
FinancialAcceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997), again refused to treat all women
equally regardless of work environment. The district court altered the judgment of the jury,
which was in favor of the plaintiff, by reducing the compensatory damages award from
$270,000 to $200,000 and also set aside the $89,000 in damages for loss of future fringe
benefits. Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 327, 327 (D. Wyo. 1996).
Even though the Tenth Circuit upheld the change in damages, the jury's verdict was upheld.
The plaintiff in Smith worked as an accounts service representative. The Tenth Circuit found
that the conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor was harassing because the office atmosphere was
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The central flaw in the Tenth Circuit's reasoning is its assumption that
women choose their work environments. Often, women can only find work in
less refined atmospheres and therefore are forced into lewd work environments. 74
not rough and tumble. Smith, 129 F.3d at 1414 (showing that the court contrasted this situation
with that of Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., which was filled with roughness and sexual
innuendo). Further, no sexual comments were made to the plaintiff's co-workers, contributing
to the conclusion that the atmosphere was not a blue-collar manufacturing work environment
Therefore, even though the plaintiff's claim was upheld, it supports the fact that work
environment is taken into account.
In this way, the plaintiff in Smith was allowed better treatment under the law than the
plaintiffs in Gross, Sauers, and Ebert. This shows that victims of sexual harassment in a
rougher atmosphere get less protection in the Tenth Circuit than those victims who are fortunate
enough to find careers in a more refined setting. Overall, the Tenth Circuit looks at the
atmosphere of a work environment to decide if a plaintiff has a claim under Title VII, all
because the plaintiff allegedly "chose" to put up with the atmosphere in order to make a living
and thus the plaintiff "chose" to be harassed.
In Pascouau v. Martin Marietta Corp., No. 98-1099, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15712 (10th
Cir. July 14, 1999), the plaintiff experienced harassment by her co-workers and supervisors
while working in document control. The plaintiff heard many discussions involving sex, sexual
materials were brought into the plaintiff's office, and the plaintiff was belittled by her co-
workers and called nicknames referring to her breast size. Id. at 874. The court cited Oncale as
support for the position it had taken in the past on work environment Id at 878 (citing Oncale,
523 U.S. at 82) (showing that the court must look at "the social context in which particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by the target'). The court noted that the environment in
which the plaintiff worked was rough and filled with lewd behavior. However, the court took
one step further than before and expressly stated that lower courts could use the educational
level of employees to excuse rough and lewd behavior under Title VII. Overall, even though the
court admits that the plaintiff was exposed to "inappropriate comments and conduct," the
environment was not hostile given the rough working conditions and the educational level of
the people who worked with the plaintiff. See id at 880.
74 See Ruth Needleman & Anne Nelson, Policy Implications: The Worth of Women's
Work; in THE WORTH OF WOMEN'S WORK: A QUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS 293, 293 (Ann Statham
et al. eds., 1987) (explaining that skilled women are "forced to accept the most tedious jobs");
BEVERLY SKEGGs, FORMATIONs OF CLASS & GENDER 162 (1997) (stating that there is an
exclusion of women in the labor market). See also Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber,
Occupations and Earnings of Women Workers, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FuruRE
37, 57 (Karen Shalleross Koziara et al. eds., 1987) (showing that sex accounts for "a substantial
portion of the wage gap"); LINDA McDOwNELL & ROSEMARY PRINGLE, DEFINING WOMEN:
SOCIAL INSTm oNs AND GENDER DIVsIONS 154-55 (1995) (showing that a majority of
women are in jobs which consist of low pay and a bad working environment); CHRISTINE
STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN 105-06 (1986) (tracing sex segregation in the workforce back as
early as 1860); Ronnie Steinberg, Gendered Instructions: Cultural Lag and Gender Bias in the
Hay System of Job Evaluation, in GENDER INEQUALrTY AT WORK 57, 57 (Jerry A. Jacobs ed.,
1995) ("Gender influences job content, the structure of authority and control, access to jobs,
training opportunities, and mobility channels.").
It should be noted that sexual harassment is most frequent "in occupations and work places
where women are new and are in the minority." Daniel Goleman, Sexual Harassment: About
2000] 1575
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
The Tenth Circuit, then, is punishing these women for an environment that is not
even their fault or of their "choosing" giving them less protection under Title
VII.75
In Scusa v. Nestle US.A. Co.,7 6 the Eighth Circuit joined the rank of circuit
courts that have looked at work environment in deciding the merits of a Title VII
claim. The plaintiff in Scusa worked in a manufacturing plant in the packaging
department She was sexually harassed as well as ostracized from the
department.77 Because the plaintiff participated in rude behavior in the plant, the
district court found that the plaintiff was not sexually harassed.78 The Scusa court
viewed Oncale in its opinion as showing that the court should not enforce a
"general civility code" and that ordinary socializing in the workplace should be
distinguished from sexual harassment.79 The Eighth Circuit then went on to
reason that even though the plaintiff was subjected to rude conduct, the conditions
of her employment were not altered enough to make her work environment
hostile.80 Since the court looks to the plaintiff's work environment, what
constitutes harassment depends on the environment of the employment In this
way, a plaintiff in a rough environment must have a stronger case of harassing
Power, NotLust, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at Cl. Thus, "women who hold jobs traditionally
held by men are far more likely to be harassed than women who do 'women's work."' Id at
C12. This is especially noted "[i]n the blue-collar work place, [where] there's often a real
hostility toward women." Id.
7 5 See Linda K. Christian-Smith, Voices of Resistance: Young Women Readers of
Romance Fiction, in BEYOND SILENCED VOICES: CLASS, RACE AND GENDER IN UNrrED STATES
SCHOOLS 169, 170 (Lois Weis & Michelle Fine eds., 1993) (showing that women want to have
"financial independence, political power, and more equitable relations').
76 181 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999).
77 Id. at 961. After a co-worker complained about sexual harassment, the plaintiff was
harassed. Plaintiff believes she was harassed because her co-workers thought she had filed the
complaint. The plaintiff was ostracized by co-workers and supervisors, including being made
fun of and getting thumped on the head. Further, the plaintiff was patted on her buttocks, kisses
were blown to her, and sexual comments were made to her. A supervisor yelled at her and even
made threatening gestures toward the plaintiff. After the plaintiff filed a complaint, the behavior
worsened: the plaintiff's car was keyed and she was treated rudely by glares and doors slammed
in her face. Id.
7 8 See id at 964 ("[F]inding appellant used offensive language, teased co-workers and
made sexual and off-color comments, which undermined her claim that she found similar
conduct by co-workers unwelcome and offensive.").
7 9 See id at 966.
80 See id. at 967. The court noted that the plaintiff experienced "unpleasant conduct and
rude comments," but because the environment (which was evasive and rude) was not changed
dramatically for the plaintiff, the environment was not hostile enough to be actionable under
Title VII. See id This means that this same plaintiff who received this same conduct may have
an actionable claim under Title VII if she worked in a good environment because her
environment would have been changed.
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instances than plaintiffs who are fortunate enough to work in a pristine
environment. This means that women who cannot find work in a pristine
environment lose protection under Title VII.
The Eighth Circuit tolerates sexual harassment in some atmospheres
believing that in order to make a bad environment worse, more sexual harassment
must exist in order for a claim to be brought. However, this belief is not on par
with racial harassment, which is also protected under the same statutory language
of Title VII as sexual harassment.81 Racial harassment plaintiffs do not have to
show that a rough environment was made worse because of racial harassment.
82
Without explanation for the distinction, courts are much more willing to enforce a
"civility code" when dealing with racial harassment claims rather than sexual
harassment claims.
2. Fifth Circuit-Looking to Work Environment Only to See ifBehavior is
Harassing and Not Teasing and Does Not Take the Particular Type of
Work Environment into Account
Since Oncale, the Supreme Court same-sex sexual harassment case, the Fifth
Circuit has changed its position on whether work environment is to be taken into
account in Title VII hostile work environment claims. In Indest v. Freeman
Decorating, Inc.,83 the plaintiff worked as an exhibitor services representative.
Her supervisor made sexual advances towards her, even though the plaintiff
warned her supervisor that his conduct was harassment.84 The Fifth Circuit cited
Oncale for the proposition that a court must look to social context, but only to
distinguish between roughhousing and harassment "Common sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to
distinguish between simple teasing and roughhousing among members of the
same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would
81 See Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me A "Bitch" Just Don't Use the "N-Word":
Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v.
Westem-Southem Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997) (urging that sexual
harassment claims, unlike other Title VII claims, present numerous hoops that a plaintiff must
jump through).
82 See Gregory, supra note 81 (explaining that courts do not allow sexual harassment
claims to survive in rough environments and distinguishes this situation from racial harassment
claims). "In the sex context, on the other hand, courts seem much more willing to acquiesce in
the common mores of the workplace or society." Id. at 748. See also George, supra note 74, at
30-32.
83 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
84 Id at 260. The supervisor made crude sexual comments and gestures. When the
plaintiff informed the supervisor that he was harassing her, the supervisor told her never to
threaten a superior. Id
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find severely hostile or abusive."85 Therefore, unlike the Eighth Circuit in Scusa,
the Fifth Circuit does not claim that Oncale's language dictates taking the
particular type of work environment into account.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit looks to work environment only to see if the
harassment was actually harassing and not teasing. The Fifth Circuit does not take
the Oncale language to the extreme like the Tenth and Eighth Circuits. The Fifth
Circuit did not discuss the atmosphere of the employment, but instead looked to
the duration of the harassment and the incidents involved.86 The court decided
that even though the conduct was of short duration and was not of an extreme
nature, the plaintiff may have been harassed. However, the plaintiff in this case
could not win because the employer took affirmative action to correct the
problem, and the plaintiffs supervisor did not harass the plaintiff after the
employer took action.87
Overall, the Fifth Circuit's stance is less severe than the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits' positions. Therefore, even though the Fifth Circuit uses the Oncale
opinion to justify looking to work environment, the Fifth Circuit considers
whether the behavior was teasing or harassing and does not require a more hostile
set of circumstances in a rough environment for a plaintiff to be successful in a
Title VII suit. Whether the Fifth Circuit takes the Oncale opinion to the next level,
as the Tenth and Eighth Circuits have done, remains to be seen.
V. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CouRTS REGARDING NON-SEX BEHAVIOR
There is also disagreement among the circuits as to whether non-sex behavior
can be taken into account when a plaintiff presents a sexual harassment claim.
Williams asserted that non-sex behavior can be harassing if the conduct is directed
toward a plaintiff because of anti-female animus. Other courts, however, purport
that only behavior that is sexual in nature can be considered sexually harassing.
Some of these courts even require behavior that is "overtly sexual. '88
85 Id. at 263 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82).
86 See id at 264. The court did not award damages to the plaintiff because the harassment
involved was of a short duration. Further, the court found the vulgar remarks no more offensive
than what the plaintiffhears from day to day (i.e. on television). Id.
87 Id at 264-67.
88 See George, supra note 72, at 32-33. Some courts require conduct that is "sexual in
nature," while other courts require behavior that is "clearly sexual." Other courts recognize that
if offensive conduct that is not sexual is directed at women, it is discriminatory and thus
cognizable under Title VII. "The additional requirement that harassment be 'sexual in nature'
again illustrates the disfavored status of the [Title VII sexual harassment] claim' Id at 33. See
also, e.g., Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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A. Courts That Take Non-Sex Behavior into Account
Some courts feel that conduct that is not sexual can support a claim of sexual
harassment under a hostile work environment claim. Like the Sixth Circuit in
Williams, the Third and Eighth Circuits have declared that non-sex behavior can
be used in a Title VII claim.89 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly
stated that non-sex behavior can be used, but has approved instances in dicta in
which non-sex behavior was found to be sufficient evidence of harassment.90
1. Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits-Non-Sex Behavior Is Harassing if
Motivated by Discriminatory Animus
In 1990, the Third Circuit in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia91 first asserted
that non-sex behavior can be sexually harassing. The plaintiffs were members of
the Accident Investigation Division of the Philadelphia Police Department. The
harassment included sexual and non-sexual behavior.92 A jury found in favor of
the plaintiffs on their Title VII claims; however, the district court reversed the
jury's decision.93 The Third Circuit asserted that the district court construed too
narrowly the type of conduct that can be used in a sexual harassment claim.94 The
court of appeals overturned the district court's language "[t]o the extent that the
court ruled that overt sexual harassment is necessary to establish a sexually hostile
environment"9 5
Therefore, the Third Circuit purports that all behavior can be considered
harassing as long as gender is shown to be a substantial factor in the conduct.
"Intimidation and hostility toward women because they are women can obviously
result from conduct other than sexual advances."9 6 The Third Circuit believes that
Title VII allows an employee to work in an environment free from hostility,
89 See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d
1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
90 See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
91 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990).
92 Id at 1471. The harassment included abusive language in person and on the phone,
physical injury to one of the plaintiffs, and destruction of property and work product. Further,
pornographic pictures of women were displayed in the police station. Id at 1471-72.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1485. The district court emphasized the lack of sexual advances or other sexual
conduct See id
95 Id
9 6 Id (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,1014 (8th Cir. 1988)).
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which means free from all hostile behavior, sexual or not.97 In this way, the court
of appeals looked at all evidence presented by the plaintiffs. The non-sexual
conduct included the recurrent disappearance of the plaintiffs' case files and work
product and the destruction of the plaintiffs' property.98 Thus, the Third Circuit
allows non-sex behavior to be taken into account under Title VII. This gives a
plaintiff an opportunity to either make a stronger case by using non-sex
harassment to support the claim or bring a case if the only harassment
experienced is non-sexual in nature.
With its 1988 decision in Hall v. Gus Construction Co., Inc.,99 the Eighth
Circuit allowed courts to look at non-sex behavior in Title VII claims. The
plaintiffs worked as traffic controllers at construction sites and were subjected to
verbal sexual abuseo°0 and offensive touching.' 01 However, the plaintiffs were
also subjected to non-sexual harassment.102 The Eighth Circuit held that any
harassment that occurs because of an employee's gender is actionable under Title
VII, sexual or not, as long as the harassment is unwelcome.103
The Eighth Circuit justifies the inclusion of non-social behavior in Title VII
claims by emphasizing the broad remedial purpose of Title VII and treating
sexual harassment claims on par with racial harassment claims.104 Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit joins the Third and Sixth Circuits by not requiring sexual conduct
in order for a plaintiff to bring an action under Title VII for a hostile work
97 See id (construing Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65). The Supreme Court gives employees the
right to work in "an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult."
Andrews points out that the Supreme Court has in no way limited this concept to intimidation or
ridicule that is sexual. Id.
9 8 Id. at 1486.
99 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).10 0 Id. at 1012. The women were called "fucking flag girls," "Herpes," "Cavern Cunt,"
and "Blond Bitch." One co-worker repeatedly asked one of the women if she 'vanted to fuck'
and requested both women to have oral sex with him. Id.
10 1 Id. The co-workers grabbed the plaintiffs' thighs and tried to grab the plaintiffs'
breasts. Id.102 See id One co-worker urinated in a plaintiff's water bottle. Co-workers also urinated
in the plaintiffs' gas tank. The women were refused a truck to take into town for a bathroom
break, and the women's complaints about malfunctioning of equipment were ignored while co-
workers' complaints were heard. Id
103 See id at 1014.
104 See id Despite the fact that the EEOC regulation emphasizes sexual behavior, the
court of appeals found that Title VII describes discrimination in broad terms and that Congress
did not choose to enumerate specific types of acts as discrimination. Further, the Eighth Circuit
found that Firefighter Supper Clubs could not exclude black employees. The Eighth Circuit in
dicta could not rationalize a different result if the Supper Clubs were excluding female
employees, suggesting that sexual harassment and racial harassment should be treated the same.
Id. (construing Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.
1972)).
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environment claim. This means that women can more easily bring suits in these
circuits if they are subjected to anti-female animus that is not sexual in nature.
2. Seventh Circuit-Dicta Pointing towards Allowing Non-Sex Behavior in
Title VH Claims
In 1986, the Seventh Circuit in Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Indiana,
stated in dicta that a plaintiff could use non-sex behavior to prove a Title VII
claim.105 The plaintiff worked as a dispatcher in the East Chicago Fire
Department. A senior dispatcher, who later became the plaintiffs immediate
supervisor, was the source of much of the harassment. The harassment against the
plaintiff was sexual in nature.106 Even though the plaintiff's case was brought
under Title VII the plaintiff won under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In its decision, the court asserted that the Equal
Protection Clause reasoning is analogous to the reasoning of a sexual harassment
claim under Title VII.1 07
The Seventh Circuit in dicta approved of various fact situations, though not
similar to the sexual harassment in question, that could be used to support a
sexual harassment claim. These fact situations involved non-sexual behavior.108
However, it is important to note that the Seventh Circuit did not cite to a case in
which the only source of harassment was non-sexual,109 thus whether the Seventh
Circuit would allow a Title VII case without any "sexual" harassment is still not
known. Overall, one can infer from the dicta in Bohen that the Seventh Circuit
would, at least, allow a plaintiff to support her claim with non-sex behavior.
B. Courts that Do Not Take Non-Sex Behavior into Account
The leading proponent of the claim that non-sexual behavior is not
harassment under Title VII is the Tenth Circuit. At first the Tenth Circuit did not
105 799 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1986).
106 Id. at 1181-83. The plaintiff's supervisor grabbed the plaintiff's crotch, would rub his
pelvis against her, forced her to leave the door open when she went to the bathroom, and made
numerous obscene comments about sexual conduct. Further, because the plaintiff refused the
supervisor's advances, rumors were started that the plaintiff was a lesbian. Id
107 Id. at 1185-86. Because the harassment under Title VII did not result in termination of
employment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff the right to
amend her complaint. So, the alternative for the court of appeals was to find for the plaintiff
under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 1188.
108 See it at 1186 (construing Woemer v. Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. ll. 1981)
(showing that liability can be found in the case of belittling remarks to a plaintiff in front of
other employees and interception of mail and phone messages).
109 See id
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reject non-sex behavior in Title VII harassment actions. 110 However, later cases
not only require sexual behavior, but use strong language such as requiring
"overtly sexual" behavior. 111 In this way, even if an aggressor's conduct is due to
a victim's gender, women in the Tenth Circuit cannot bring a claim if the conduct
is not sexual. Further, if a plaintiff does have sexual conduct to back up a
harassment claim, the plaintiff cannot strengthen her claim with evidence of
conduct that is not sexual in nature but does evince an anti-female animus.112
Also, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, in dicta, have reasoned that non-sex
behavior should not be taken into account in a Title VII claim although the courts
have not explicitly held as such. 113
1. Tenth Circuit--Only "Overtly" Sexual Behavior Can Be Used in a
Title VUI Sexual Harassment Claim
In 1995, the Tenth Circuit in Howard v. Beech Aircraft Corporation
disallowed the use ofnon-sex behavior in a Title VII claim.114 The plaintiff was a
sheet metal parts inspector for the defendant. 115 The plaintiff complained of
several comments made to her, including that she had 'Martha Lattamore
syndrome" and that the "smartest woman at Beech was not as smart as the
dumbest man." 16 Also, one of the employees pretended to wipe his hands on the
plaintiffs' shirt.117 However, the Tenth Circuit felt that the conduct was not
"overtly sexual enough" to support a sexual harassment claim under Title VII 18
Thus, the conduct cannot just relate to sexuality (such as comments regarding
breast size), but the conduct must be overtly sexual in nature in order for a
plaintiff to succeed under Title VII in the Tenth Circuit.
A month later, the Tenth Circuit put more bite into its position that non-sex
behavior could not be used in a sexual harassment claim in Gross v. Burggraf
110 See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987).
111 See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
112 See id
113 See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982); B.T. Jones v.
Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986).
114 No. 94-3259, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 14692 (10th Cir. July 14, 1995).
115 Id. at *2. At one point, the plaintiff was suspended with pay. Upon returning to work,
the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging age, sex, and ancestry discrimination. Id
116 Id. at *6-7. (The plaintiff felt that the ' Martha Lattamore syndrome' comment was
made because she had big breasts, and the comment insinuated that the plaintiffs back must
hurt. Id at *6-7).
1 1 7 Id. at*7.
118 Id. at *7. The court also felt that the comments made by plaintiffs co-workers were
not frequent enough. Id.
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Construction Company.19 The Tenth Circuit held that a statement relating to
wanting to punch women in the face was not sexual enough, and thus did not
involve sexual harassment. "Gross had to present admissible evidence that she
was subjected to a 'steady barrage of opprobrious [sexual] comments"' 120 in
order to bring a sexual harassment claim. Further, the Court felt that using the
word "ass" was not sexual harassment because it is a sexual term that refers to the
anatomy of both sexes.121 Also, heated comments to the plaintiff, even if only
directed to the plaintiff, were not sexually harassing because none of the
comments were sexual. 122 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit in Gross strengthened its
previous new position given in Howard.
In Turner v. Reynold Ford, Inc., the Tenth Circuit took its assertion one step
further and denied a claim because the behavior asserted by the plaintiff was not
sexual enoughl '2 3 The plaintiff worked as a salesperson at a car dealership. The
plaintiff and a co-worker had a brief sexual relationship; after the relationship
ended the co-worker began to harass the plaintiff.124 There were some incidents
of harassment that occurred at work.125 The court discounted the sexual conduct
toward the plaintiff while she was not at work. While at work, however, the
harassment was not sexual in nature and was thus not sexual harassment at all.126
Since the plaintiff was subjected to no "overtly sexually related conduct at work,"
the Tenth Circuit clearly stated that the plaintiff was not sexually harassed at all
and did not have a claim under Title VI. 127 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit went
against the spirit of Oncale by asserting that at work behavior that is not sexual
cannot be used to support a Title VII claim, even if after work, sexual behavior
119 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995). See also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text for
the facts and details of this case.
120 Id. at 1543 (construingBolden, 43 F.3d 545, 551 (1995)).
121 Id. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit requires more than merely relating to sexuality; it must
be a sexually charged term that can relate only to women, even if the term was used only
against a woman. See id.
122 Id. at 1546. The Court refers to statements such as her supervisor saying the following:
"her problem"; "skating on thin ice"; and needing to call him "sir." Id
123 No. 97-6152, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9552 (10th Cir. May 5, 1998).
124 Id at *2. Once the plaintiff ended the relationship with the co-worker, the co-worker
became dominant and controlling. At one point the co-worker followed the plaintiff and
assaulted and raped her. At another point the co-worker grabbed the plaintiff's arm giving her a
bruise. Both of these incidents happened away from work. Id at *3.
125 Id at *3. The co-worker threatened to ruin the plaintiff's name. Furthermore, the co-
worker was talking about the plaintiff with other co-workers. The co-worker followed the
plaintiff around the office trying to talk to the plaintiff. Id
126 See id. at *13-14. "The most that can be said for plaintiff's workplace environment is
that [the co-worker] at times followed her around, tried to talk to her and exchanged harsh
words with her." Id at *14.
127 See id at *14.
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was used to harass the plaintiff. Thus, not only does a plaintiff in the Tenth Circuit
need overtly sexual behavior to bring a claim, this overtly sexual behavior must
be shown by the plaintiff to have occurred at work 128 Any sexual harassment
after work hours, sexual or not, is not sufficient in the Tenth Circuit to bring a
Title VII claim. 12 9
The Tenth Circuit will allow a claim for sexual harassment only if the
conduct is clearly sexual in nature, if the sexual comment only applies to women,
and if the conduct happened only at work In this way, a woman has little help
from Title VII, because in the Tenth Circuit, Title VII protects women only from
a small sliver of harassment.
A central misunderstanding of the Tenth Circuit concerns the nature of sexual
harassment. Sexual harassment is not about sex, but about power.130 If the Tenth
Circuit allows only sexual behavior to be considered, the problem Title VII was
created to combat, namely the effect of harassment on women, will not be
12 8 At least two cases have allowed evidence of harassment outside of the workplace to
bolster a sexual harassment claim when the harassment outside of the workplace can be tied to
the employer. See Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, n.9 (3rd Cir. 1999) (showing
that when the plaintiff is forced to work with the harasser outside of the workplace and the
harassment occurred while working with the co-worker on job related activities outside of the
workplace, the harassment has connection to the employer); Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d
767, 770-74 (6th Cir. 1996) (showing that the harassment was tied to work even though the
alleged harassment took place outside of work; however, the plaintiff did not prevail on her
Title VII claim because the plaintiff did not give the employer timely notice and the harassment
was not outrageous enough).
129 Sexual conduct has been discussed recently in a successful sexual harassment claim in
the Tenth Circuit. In Shoemaker v. National Management Resources Corp., decided in April of
1998, the Tenth Circuit continued stating that non-sex behavior could not be used in a Title VII
claim. No. 97-6251, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7147 (10th Cir. Apr. 9, 1998). Most of the
harassment the plaintiff endured was sexual in nature, even though there was at least one
incident where the harassment was non-sexual. Id. at *3-4 (showing that the supervisor
slammed a book in the plaintiff's face). The court noted that most of the behavior was sexual
and thus the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment, remanding the case back to the
district court. Id. at *9 ("[E]xcept for the book-slamming incident, the incidents alleged by
plaintiff are either overtly sexual or could reasonably be construed as sexual.") Therefore, even
though the Tenth Circuit did not deny a claim because it was not supported by non-sexual
behavior, the court allowed the plaintiff's claim to survive summary judgment only because
most of the conduct was sexual in nature. This allows one to conclude that the Tenth Circuit
was still only willing to listen to Title VII claims involving sexual behavior.
13 0 See Gargi Bhattacharyya, Offence is the Best Defence?: Pornography and Racial
Violence, in RETHINKING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 82, 82 (Clair Brant & Yun Lee Too, eds.,
1994) (explaining that sexual harassment is a reminder of "power relations"); Daniel Goleman,
supra note 74, at Cl (explaining that extensive research has shown that sexual harassment has
more to do with power than sex). See also DAVID M. BUSS & NEIL M. MALAMUrH, SEX,
POWER, CoNFLicr: EVOLuTIONARY AND FEMINIST PERSPECnVES 54 (1996) (urging that sexual
harassment is a combination of asserting power, sexual behavior, and conflict).
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treated. 131 Therefore, there will be no recourse for women who are harassed in the
workplace because of their sex, as supervisors and co-workers will change their
tactics from sexual to non-sex sexual harassment.132 In this way, Title VII is
ineffective in combating sexual harassment, which is a power issue and not a sex
issue.
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit is allowing claims of harassment under Title
VII to be treated differently by allowing only sexual behavior to count as sexual
harassment Racial harassment plaintiffs do not have to show that the aggressor's
conduct was "racial in nature." 133 Since racial harassment plaintiffs must only
show that the harassment exhibited racial animus, sexual harassment plaintiffs
should only have to show anti-female animus when bringing a claim, so that each
of these Title VII claims will be treated on a par with one another.
2. The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits-Using Dicta to Assert that Non-Sexual
Conduct Cannot Be Used to Support a Sexual Harassment Claim
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit stated in dicta that sexual harassment involved
conduct only of a sexual nature in Henson v. City of Dundee,134 while the Fifth
Circuit followed suit in 1986 with B.T Jones v. Flagship International.135 Both
cases involved harassment that was based on sexual behavior.136 In Henson, the
Eleventh Circuit cited to EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)
regulations in which sexual harassment was described as involving only sexual
131 See M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Work Environments and Summay
Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311, 312 (Spring 1999) (showing that Title
VII is designed to "strengthen and improve Federal Civil rights laws, deter unlawful
discrimination in the -workplace, and to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment" (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105
Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1994))).
132 See Bhattacharyya, supra note 130, at 82 (showing that sexual harassment is about
keeping power relations as they are and maintaining the status quo).
133 See George, supra note 72, at 32-33. Racial harassment would be proven even if a
supervisor used a negative non-racial word to describe all black employees, such as the word
"dunce." Id. Furthermore, one case found the word "bitch" not sexually explicit, while another
case in the same circuit found the word "nigger" racially explicit. See Gregory, supra note 81, at
750--56.
134 682 F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
135 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986).
136 In Henson, the Chief of Police requested that the plaintiff have sexual relations with
him and threatened the plaintiff's job if the plaintiff would not comply with his demands.
Further, the Chief of Police made numerous sexual inquiries and vulgarities towards the
plaintiff. Henson, 682 F.2d at 899. In B.T. Jones, plaintiff's supervisor made sexual advances
towards her and decorated an office party with bare-breasted mermaids. B.T. Jones, 793 F.2d at
716-17.
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conduct 137 Thus by taking into account the limited information given in the
Eleventh Circuit, it seems like the Eleventh Circuit approves of the regulation and
plans to follow the regulation if the need arises in the future.
In B. T. Jones, the Fifth Circuit, while stating the five factors needed to prove
a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim, asserted that unwelcome
sexual harassment included only harassment that was sexual in nature.1 38 In this
way, one can assume that the Fifth Circuit will neither hear a case involving only
non-sex sexual harassment, nor allow a claim to be supported by non-sex
behavior.
Even though neither the Eleventh or Fifth Circuits have made a ruling
regarding non-sex behavior and Title VII claims, at least one author of a law
review article found that these circuits will not allow non-sex behavior to become
a part of a Title VII claim. 139 Therefore, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to this
point seem to have joined the ranks of circuits that require all behavior to be
sexual in order for a sexual harassment hostile work environment claim to
succeed.
V. PROPOSALS ABOUT WORK ENVIRONMENT AND NON-SEx BEHAVIOR
The Williams court was correct when it decided that the type of work
environment should not be taken into account in a Title VII claim and non-sex
behavior should be used to support a sexual harassment claim if the conduct was
based on sex.140 There are several reasons why these holdings in Williams are
correct.
137 See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1981)):
In pertinent part the guidelines provide that '[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when ... such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive worldng environment.'
Id.
138 See B.T Jones, 793 F.2d at 719. "The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment, i.e., sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome in the sense that it is unsolicited or uninvited and
is undesirable or offensive to the employee... ?" Id. (italics in original).
139 See George, supra note 72, at 32-33 & nn.161, 162. This law review article notes that
some circuits, including the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, have needed conduct that is "sexual in
nature" for a Title VII claim to be heard. See id.
140 See Williams, 187 F.3d at 553, 564.
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A. Work Environment
There are many reasons why the work environment should not be taken into
consideration in a Title VII sexual harassment claim. First, Title VII was enacted
to improve the social status of women, and by taking work environment into
account, women are forced to continue in their current social status.141 Second,
sexual harassment claims under Title VII should not look to work environment
because environment is not considered in racial harassment claims under Title
VI1.14 2 Third, the objective test given by Harris v. Forklift Systems 43 provides a
safeguard against enforcing a civility code, without the need to take into account
the plaintiff's work environment. 144
1. Social Status of Women
The fact that a plaintiff works in a rough work environment should not
diminish that individual's claims under Title VII. If the courts make a plaintiff in
a rough working environment present a stronger sexual harassment claim in order
to recover, then women who need protection the most will not receive it.145 This
is because women in blue-collar settings usually are there not out of choice, but
because lack of money, education, or because society puts them there.146 In this
141 See infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
143 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
14 4 See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
145 See Goleman, supra note 74, at C12 (explaining that in the blue-collar workplace there
is hostility towards women because men see women as invading the "masculine work
environment' and showing that women machinists had the highest reported harassment out of
all occupations in a recent study). Furthermore, the use of harassment increases dramatically in
jobs traditionally held by men. This is because harassment is used as a tactic to control or
frighten women. See id.
146 Women face severe limitations in the job market. See Ray Marshall & Beth Paulin,
Employment and Earnings of Women: Historical Perspective, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST,
PRESENT, FUTURE 1, 30 (Karen Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987) ("[O]ccupational and
earnings differences reflect differentials in education ... "); MARJORIE FORD MARUGGE-
WOLFE, A COMPARATvE STUDY OF LOW-INCOME WOMEN AND THEIR PERCEIvED BARRIERS
TO SUCCESSFUL ENROLLMENT, PARTICIPATION, OR COMPTON OF EDUCATION, TRAINING, OR
EMPLOYMENT 34, 34-43 (1999) (showing that lack of education and training as well as
discrimination on the basis of sex in employment are barriers for women trying to find jobs);
Needleman & Nelson, supra note 74, at 297 ("Improved educational opportunities are essential
if women are to move out of traditional job areas."). See also Christian-Smith, supra note 75, at
170 (explaining that despite "the desires of many women for financial independence... most
women still earn less than men"); SKEGGS, supra note 74, at 162 ("[W]omen... [are] excluded
from positions in the labor market, the education system, from forms of cultural capital and
from trading arenas.").
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way, women with more money, education, and power in society have better
protection from sexual harassment because they are better able to pick jobs with a
refined work atmosphere. 147 Title VII was not enacted with the intent of
protecting some women more than others. Title VII was enacted to protect
women against harassment in all social settings. 148 In this way, the courts allow
unequal protection under the law, discriminating against women who are the
poorest and neediest of all. This type of atmosphere should not be allowed to be
factored into a determination, making poor women suffer because they allegedly
chose to work149 in such an environment or because their claim has to show
worse behavior than already exhibited in the rough environment.
Also, the courts, by allowing the type of environment to be factored into a
harassment claim, are discouraging women from working.150  This
discouragement not only goes against the feminist movement, but goes against
the purpose of the welfare system.151 Women on welfare are most likely the
147 The job situation for women is bleak, causing them to have a lack of power. See Blau
& Ferber, supra note 74, at 57 (showing that the wage gap is best explained by the sex of the
worker); Christina Jonung, Patterns of Occupational Segregation by Sex in the Labor Market,
in SEX DIsCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE LABOR MARKEr AND EMPLOYMENT
POLICY 44, 44 (Guinther Schmid & Renate Weitzel, eds., 1984) (stating that a majority of
women make up jobs which are "low paid, heavily supervised, with poor working conditions
and little chance of advancement'); MCDOWELL & PRINGLE, supra note 74, at 154-55 (same);
STANSELL, supra note 74, at 105-06 (tracing labor segregation by sex to the mid-1800s);
Steinberg, supra note 74, at 57 (1997) (showing that the market has "assumptions about gender
that saturate the structure of compensation" keeping women in lesser quality jobs); Donald
Tomaskovic-Devey, Sex Composition and Gendered Earnings Inequality: A Comparison of
Job and Occupational Models, in GENDER INEQUALrIY AT WORK 23, 23 (Jerry A. Jacobs ed.,
1995) ("Sex composition has come to represent the dominant.., explanation of the male-
female earnings gap in sociological literature.").
148 Title VII allows "employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986). The type of employee-blue-collar versus otherwise-was not distinguished under
Title VII.
149 Of course, these women do not choose to work in a bad environment. Most rough
environments are blue-collar and many women cannot get better jobs in more pristine office
environments. These women lack the money, education, and skill for better work environments.
See generally SKEGGS, supra note 74.
150 Women do avoid jobs and job advancement because of sexual harassment. See BRAVO
& CASSEDY, supra note 9, at 48 (stating that women avoid the harasser causing neglect to job
duties and career opportunities and showing that women leave jobs because of harassment);
Ruth Jamieson, Risk; Responsibility and Sexual Harm, in RETlNKING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
99, 100 (Clair Brant & Yun Lee Too, eds., 1994) (showing that women "routinely engage in
avoidance strategies" in order to avoid sexual harassment).
1 5 1 See RANDY ALBELDA & CHRIS TILLY, GLASS CEILINGS AND BOTrOMLESS Prrs:
WOMEN's WORK, WOMEN's POVERTY 107 (1997) ("[W]elfare 'reform' in the 1980s and early
1990s focused on job placement ... ?'); MMI ABRAMOVriz, UNDER ATrACK, FIGHTING BACK:
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women who will be disadvantaged if courts are allowed to take a particular work
environment into account.152 Because women on welfare lack the ability to
receive better jobs, these women are forced to deal with rough blue-collar
environments, including harassment that women in other settings do not have to
face.153 In this way, these women see a greater benefit in returning to the welfare
system than dealing with such harassing behavior with little pay.154 Overall, the
idea that a plaintiff who works in a rough environment must endure more
harassment than other plaintiffs in better working environments is making a
distinction on social class and is allowing unequal protection under the law. Title
VII is available to all who are harassed, regardless of social class.
2. Putting Sexual Harassment on Par with Racial Harassment
In placing sexual harassment claims on par with racial harassment claims
under Title VII, the courts cannot take a particular type of work environment into
account. 155 Courts seem to hint that in the rough world of employment, a certain
amount of sexual harassment is inevitable. The court system, however, does not
WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THEUNITED STATES 10 (1996) ("There is very strong support for job
training and large-scale job programs, not only for current welfare recipients but for all able-
bodied Americans willing to work."); MARUGGE-WOLFE, supra note 146, at 31 ("Current
government programs are designed to assist the chronically unemployed in getting
education/training and/or jobs.").
152 See ABRAMOVrrZ, supra note 151, at 11 ("Women ... represent 50 percent of the
population and the majority of welfare clients."); ALBELDA & TILLY, supra note 151, at 8
(showing that poverty is a women's issue because two-thirds of all poor are women and thus
government policy toward the poor is a women's issue); CATHERINE PELISSIER KINGFISHER,
WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE TRAP 3 (1996) (stating that women comprise the majority
of public relief).
153 Women on welfare often cannot find adequate work. "As with many women on
welfare, lack of educational credentials left the women restricted to minimum wage work,
primarily in the service sector." See KINGFISHER, supra note 152, at 24. These low-paying jobs
usually do not provide medical coverage or child care. Id.; ABRAMOvrrz, supra note 151, at 32
("[M]any welfare mothers hold sporadic full-time jobs rather than steady part-time ones, and
the majority are low-wage 'women's occupations.").
154 See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 151, at 84-89 (explaining that reasons why women have
such a strong relationship with the welfare system include "sexism, patriarchy, the gender
division of labor, and social reproduction"); KINGFISHER, supra note 152, at 24-27 (showing
that women do consciously decide to go back to welfare instead of work).
155 Courts do not treat claims of sexual harassment and racial harassment on the same
terms. See Gregory, supra note 81, at 741-43 (1997). There is greater ease in establishing a
prima facie case for all types of harassment under Title VII, except, of course, sexual
harassment, which presents many hoops through which a potential plaintiff must jump.
"[S]exual harassment claims are disfavored and should only be accepted in the clearest of
cases." See George, supra note 72, at 3.
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feel that racial harassment can be tolerated in the same way.156 Because courts
may feel that sexual harassment is inevitable, especially in certain types of work
environments, the courts may not allow a claim for some plaintiffs in rough
working environments in order to avoid enforcing a "civility code." However,
when courts look to racial harassment they do not look to see if a particular
environment is rough and thus state that some types of racial harassment must be
borne by the plaintiffs in these environments. 157 On the contrary, courts are more
willing to force a "civility code" when dealing with racial harassment. Since the
particular type of work environment is not stressed in racial harassment claims,
sexual harassment also under Title VII, should be treated in the same way.
3. Safeguard Available that Does Not Require
Looking to Work Environment
There is a safeguard for not enforcing a civility code, even if a particular
work environment is not taken into account. This safeguard is the test given in
Harris v. Forklift Systems 158 where the Supreme Court established subjective and
objective tests. Before a plaintiff can be successful under Title VII, it must be
shown that she was subjectively harassed, meaning that the plaintiff perceived
that she was harassed. Further, a plaintiff must show that she was objectively
harassed, meaning that a reasonable person would see the conduct as
harassing.159 By looking at the reasonable person's point of view, the courts
cannot impose their own ideal standards about how a workplace should operate.
Instead, the court is forced to look at what a reasonable person could tolerate. In
this way, the court cannot impose an ideal civility code, but instead is forced to
look through the eyes of a reasonable person grounded in reality.160 Therefore,
even without looking to a plaintiff's work environment courts will not be able to
force a "civility code" on all workplaces in society. This is because the court must
look to a reasonable person's standard of what is hostile, not a moral code of how
workplaces should operate.
15 6 See Gregory, supra note 81, at 776.
157 See generally George supra note 72, at 30-32 (showing one difference between racial
and sexual harassment being that sexual harassment looks to work environment to see if
everyone in an environment deals with a particular type of behavior). "In the sex context, on the
other hand, courts seem much more willing to acquiesce in the common mores of the
workplace or society." See Gregory, supra note 81, at 748 (discussing the fact that courts feel
that the more prevalent the sexism in the environment, the more difficult it is to have a case
under Title VII and distinguishing this fact from the race context under Title VII).
158 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
159 See id.
160 This argument was expressed in Williams. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying
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B. Non-Sex Behavior
There are many reasons why a court should look at non-sex behavior when
deciding a Title VII sexual harassment claim. First, the nature of harassment is
not about sex, but about power. This means that any type of harassment in which
power is asserted against women, sexual or not, is indeed sexual harassment.161
Second, the broad purpose of Title VII is to protect against all forms of
harassment whether or not the harassment is sexual in nature.162 Third, Title VII
was meant to help women to rise from their current social class, which means that
a broad reading of Title VII is needed.1 63 Fourth, in order to place sexual
harassment claims under Title VII on par with racial harassment claims under
Title VII, harassment that evinces an anti-female animus should be considered in
a sexual harassment case, regardless of whether or not the harassment is
sexual.164
1. Nature of Sexual Harassment
Non-sex behavior should be used in deciding hostile work environment
sexual harassment cases because many forms of harassment keep women from
being treated equally in the workplace. Harassment is not about sex, but
power.165 In this way, men in power who wish to assert their power will harass in
a way that is not sexual. 166 Even though the conduct is not sexual and thus not
punishable, the effect of the conduct will be the same: keeping women in their
161 See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
162 See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
163 See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
164 See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
165 See Goleman supra note 74, at C12 (stating that "extensive research
on... harassment" has shown that sexual harassment "has less to do with sex than with
power"). See also Bhattacharyya, supra note 130, at 82. See also Buss & MALAMLUH, supra
note 130, at 54 (showing that sexual harassment is motivated by a combination of "sex, power,
and conflict" ). The author explains the power hypothesis of sexual harassment even though the
author does not necessarily agree with the hypothesis. See id. at 55-57 (showing the power
hypothesis proposition that "sexual aspects" of sexual harassment as "means to an end"-the
end of asserting power). Power does have a role in sexual harassment because victims are more
likely to get fired. See Michael V. Studd, Sexual Harassment, in SEX, POwER, CoNFLicr.
EVOLUTIONARY AND FEmNsT PERSPE~rflES, 54, 80 (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth,
eds., 1996).
166 See Bhattacharyya, supra note 130, at 82 ("Harassment is a way of ensuring people
who are already having a bad time are painfully aware of their predicament. It serves as a
reminder of local power relations, while reproducing the same pattems.").
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place. 167 In this way, men in a position of power can give the same consequences
to women without getting into trouble. Thus, Title VII will be of no effect in the
long run if courts treat all non-sex behavior as unpunishable. The type of
harassment will change to avoid consequences, but the effect on women will be
the same; thus, Title VII will not protect any plaintiff from sexual harassment if
non-sex behavior is not acknowledged.
2. Broad Purpose of Title VII
Including non-sex behavior in sexual harassment claims is within the spirit of
Title VII. Title VII was designed to eliminate all types of discrimination in the
workplace. Its broad purpose was to "strengthen and improve Federal Civil rights
laws, deter unlawful harassment in the workplace, and to provide additional
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment."' 168 Neither Title VII
nor its legislative history calls for banning a type of harassment from recognition.
Title VII has a broad purpose which is ineffectual if a large number of harassing
events are not taken into account. In this way, the purpose of Title VII is blunted
unless non-sex behavior, which is a type of harassment in employment, is taken
into account under a Title VII hostile work environment claim.
3. Social Class of Women
Again, the court system should be encouraging women to work and make the
economy stronger.169 Women faced with a decision to enter the work force will
take the type of behavior that they receive from others into consideration when
making this decision.170 Women should not be held back from achieving success
167 See Goleman, supra note 74, at C1 (stating that harassment "is a way to keep women
in their place; through harassment men devalue a woman's role in the work place by calling
attention to her sexuality").
168 Medina, supra note 131, at 312 (construing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2, 105 Stat.
1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1994))).
169 Women can give "tremendous energy, creativity, persistence, and skill" to the labor
market. See Needleman & Nelson, supra note 74, at 293.
170 Women make job decisions by taking into account harassment which they will have to
endure. See BRAVO & CASSEDY, supra note 9, at 47-48 (stating that sexual harassment victims
"lose their jobs and settle for lower-paying ones" to avoid sexual harassment); Jamieson, supra
note 150, at 100 (showing that women take precautions to avoid sexual harassment and rape
because of fear); Aveen Maguire, Power: Now You See It, Now You Don't. A Woman's Guide
to How Power Works, in DEFINING WOMEN: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENDER DIVISioNs 18,
24-25 (Linda McDowell & Rosemary Pringle, eds., 1992) ("Knowing that power can be
exercised against [women] at every level, from the crudest to the most subtle, may be, quite
simply, too daunting.'); SKEGS, supra note 74, at 162 ("Shame was produced as a result of
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in the workplace, even if the harassment women must endure is only of a non-
sexual nature. Courts should, thus, look to the effect of the discrimination and not
just look to labels such as "sex in sexual harassment. Harassment not only hurts
women in the workforce, but hurts the United States' economy and well-being.1 71
Harassment that has such a negative effect must be taken into account and
therefore, the courts should look at non-sex behavior that is damaging not only to
individual plaintiffs, but to society in general.
4. Putting Sexual Harassment on Par with Racial Harassment
Finally, racial discrimination and sexual harassment should be on an equal
par since both are governed by Title VII. Plaintiffs in racial discrimination cases
do not have the extra burdens that plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases have.172
One of these burdens on plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases is that the
harassment be "sexual in nature." 173 In racial harassment cases, the conduct does
not have to be "racial in nature" but instead the conduct must just show an racial
animus.174 Because race and sexual harassment are both under Title VII, and
because Title VII and its legislative history do not indicate that these types of
[women's] consciousness of their 'place'--through the mismatch of their dispositions and
positions.").
17 1 BRAvo & CAssEDY, supra note 9, at 49-50 ("A typical Fortune 500 company with
23,750 employees loses $6.7 million a year because of sexual harassment.... [S]exual
harassment cost the federal government $267 million between 1985 and 1987.); Buss &
MALAMUTH, supra note 130, at 79-80 ("With respect to employment consequences, we found
that victims were discharged (i.e. fired) from employment in 40.2% of the cases, quit
voluntarily in 47.8%, and experienced other employment consequences (e.g. not promoted) in
12% of cases."); Pierce, supra note 9, at 1071 (showing that sexual harassment affects victims
physically and psychologically causing productivity to decline). The development of equal
treatment for women will have "important implications for the nation's political, social, and
economic health." Marshall & Paulin, supra note 146, at 33. Furthermore, the U.S. derives
benefits from having a multi-cultural employment system. Id
172 See supra note 155.
173 See George, supra note 72, at 32-33 (showing that another hoop for sexual harassment
plaintiffs that racial harassment plaintiffs do not face is the requirement that behavior be sexual
in nature). Racial harassment is found even if a supervisor used a non-racial term such as
"dunce" to refer to all his black employees. See id Therefore, the result should not be different
in sexual harassment cases; if behavior is because of sex, it should be considered in a sexual
harassment claim. See id Further, one author illustrates that a case involving the word "nigger"
against a black plaintiff was found to be harassing, while another case involving the word
"bitch" against a female plaintiff was not found to be sexual in nature and thus not harassing.
These comparable claims heard by the Seventh Circuit were treated in a different light. "The
court in Galloway viewed the sexual epithet in a completely different light, embracing some of
the same arguments of 'context' that had been dismissed in Rodgers." Gregory, supra note 81,
at 760.
174 See George, supra note 72, at 32-33.
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harassment should be treated differently, sexual harassment needs to be put on a
par with racial harassment If a female is harassed because of her sex, regardless
whether the conduct is "sexual in nature," a female should be able to bring a
claim under Title VII with the same rights that are given to a racial harassment
plaintiff.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit was correct when deciding the issues of work environment
and non-sex behavior in Williams. Work environment should not be taken into
consideration in sexual harassment claims, while non-sex behavior should be
taken into account when looking at sexual harassment hostile work environment
claims under Title VII.
Work environment should not be taken into consideration in a sexual
harassment claim. By taking this stance, women will not be punished if they can
only get lesser quality jobs.175 Furthermore, this stance will allow the economy to
become stronger by encouraging women to work 176 If work environment is not
looked at, all women will be protected under Title VII, regardless of social
class,177 and sexual harassment will be treated similarly to racial harassment in
the court system. 178 Also, the court system can make sure that it is not enforcing a
general civility code by the test given in Harris v. Forklift Systems. 179 In this way,
the court system can ensure it meets the requirements given by the Supreme Court
in hearing sexual harassment claims under Title VII while, at the same time,
protecting women from the evils associated with taking the particular type of
work environment into consideration.
Non-sex behavior should be considered in sexual harassment cases under
Title VII. This is because harassment is about power and not about sexuality.180
This means that any harassment that involves a power assertion should be looked
at in a sexual harassment claim, regardless of whether the harassment is sexual in
nature. Furthermore, Title VII was written in a broad spirit to combat all
discrimination that evinces an anti-female animus.181 It is also important to
encourage women to work to make the economy stronger. If courts combat all
types of harassment, women will feel safer when returning to work.182 Another
17 5 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
17 6 See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text
177 See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text
179 See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text
181 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text
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reason why non-sex behavior should be looked at is the fact that racial harassment
plaintiffs must only show that the harassment evinced an anti-racial animus and
not that the words used were racial in nature.183 In this way, non-sex behavior
should be considered in order to put sexual harassment claims on par with racial
harassment claims.
Therefore, other circuits should follow the lead of Williams v. General
Motors Corp. by not taking a particular type of work environment into account
and by considering non-sex behavior that shows "anti-female animus." This
allows all sexual harassment plaintiffs to be protected under Title VII, regardless
of the type of powerful behavior imposed (sexual or non-sexual) and regardless of
the type of work environment in which a plaintiff works.
183 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text
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